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Abstract
Face detection and recognition benchmarks have shifted
toward more difficult environments. The challenge pre-
sented in this paper addresses the next step in the direc-
tion of automatic detection and identification of people from
outdoor surveillance cameras. While face detection has
shown remarkable success in images collected from the
web, surveillance cameras include more diverse occlusions,
poses, weather conditions and image blur. Although face
verification or closed-set face identification have surpassed
human capabilities on some datasets, open-set identifica-
tion is much more complex as it needs to reject both un-
known identities and false accepts from the face detector.
We show that unconstrained face detection can approach
high detection rates albeit with moderate false accept rates.
By contrast, open-set face recognition is currently weak and
requires much more attention.
1. Introduction
Automatic face recognition is an important field and has
a tremendous impact on many domains of our life. For ex-
ample, private images can be sorted by persons that appear
on them (e.g., Apple Photos or Google Photos), or airports
perform automatic face recognition as passport control [29].
As the latter has severe security implications, most face
recognition challenges such as the Face Recognition Ven-
dor Tests1 evaluate algorithms that perform verification, i.e.,
where a pair of model and probe images is tested whether
they contain the same identity. Usually, a similarity between
model and probe image is thresholded, where the threshold
is computed based on a desired false acceptance rate. Other
challenges included more difficult data, such as the Point
and Shoot Challenge [6] or the Face Recognition Evalua-
tion in Mobile Environment [11].
On the other hand, identification seems to be a more in-
tricate problem, as a probe image must be compared to all
1https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/face-recognition-vendor-test-frvt
identities enrolled in a gallery. As Klontz and Jain [20]
and Kemelmacher-Shlizerman et al. [18] showed, when the
gallery is large and probe images are taken in uncontrolled
conditions, identifying the correct person is not trivial. In
real surveillance scenarios subjects usually do not realize
that their faces are captured and, hence, do not cooperate
with the system. Furthermore, most of the captured faces
will not belong to any person in the gallery and should be
declared as unknown, leading to open-set face recognition.
Also, face detectors might have false accepts, i.e., where a
region of the background is detected as a face. These mis-
detections also need to be classified as unknown by face
recognition algorithms. Therefore, additionally to identify-
ing the correct person in the gallery based on difficult im-
agery, for an unknown face or misdetection, the similarity to
all persons in the gallery must be below a certain threshold,
which is usually computed based on a desired false identi-
fication rate. While the latest face recognition benchmark
IJB-A [19] includes an open-set protocol, it does not treat
misdetections that are subsequently labeled with an identity
as an error, which makes that benchmark incomplete.
For the UCCS unconstrained face detection and open-
set face recognition challenge2 we invited participants to
submit results of face detection and face recognition algo-
rithms. Given a set of images in the training set, containing
23,349 labeled faces of 1085 known and a number of un-
known persons, participants were to detect all faces in the
test set, and to assign each detected face an identity of the
gallery, or an unknown label when the algorithm decided
that the person has not been labeled as known.
2. Dataset
To run the challenge, the UnConstrained College Stu-
dents (UCCS) dataset was developed as a significantly ex-
tended version of the dataset presented by Sapkota and
Boult [30]. It contains high-resolution images captured
from an 18 megapixel camera at the University of Colorado
Colorado Springs, aimed at capturing people walking on a
2http://vast.uccs.edu/Opensetface
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Figure 1: EXAMPLES OF THE UCCS DATASET. Two exemplary images of the UCCS dataset including hand-annotated bounding
boxes and identity labels are shown in (a). In (b) the cropped faces of the two images are displayed. Faces with the same color mark the
same identity, while gray boxes mark unknown identities.
sidewalk from a long range of 100–150 meters, at one frame
per second. The dataset collection was spread across 20 dif-
ferent days, between February 2012 and September 2013
providing a variety of images in different weather condi-
tions such as sunny or snowy days. There are frequent oc-
clusions due to tree branches or poles as well as sunglasses,
winter caps, or fur jackets that make both detection and
recognition a challenging problem. Since the captured sub-
jects are unaware of the dataset collection and casually fo-
cus on random activities such as glancing at a mobile phone
or conversing with peers while walking, there is a wide vari-
ety of face poses along with some cases of motion blur, and
many cases where faces are not in the focus of the camera.
The dataset consists of more than 70000 hand-cropped
face regions, which are generally larger than the actual
face. An identity is manually assigned to many of the faces,
where 20 % of these identities appear in two or more days.
Due to the manual nature of the labeling process, for ap-
proximately 50 % of the face regions no identity could be
assigned. Two example images including their manually
cropped and labeled faces are shown in Fig. 1.
2.1. Protocol
We split the UCCS database into training, validation and
test sets. For each image in the training and validation sets
we provide a list of bounding boxes with their correspond-
ing identity labels, including the label−1 for unknown sub-
jects. In the test set we only supply a list of images, in which
the participants need to detect the faces (face detection chal-
lenge) and provide an identity label including a similarity
score to each bounding box (face recognition challenge).
To be able to evaluate the difference of recognizing un-
known identities that have been seen during training (so-
called known unknowns) and subjects that have never been
seen (unknown unknowns) [12], we artificially mask several
of the known identities. Some of these masked identities are
present in the training, validation and test set, while some
other masked identities are excluded from the training set.
More details about the distribution of images and identity
labels in our evaluation protocol can be found in Tab. 1.
3. Challenge Participants
Participants were invited to submit a short description of
their algorithms. They are listed in the order of submission
and marked with their according institution (a – f , cf. list of
authors on first page).
3.1. Face Detection
Baseline: The Baseline face detector uses the out-of-the-
box face detector of Bob [2], which relies on boosted Local
Binary Pattern (LBP) features [3] extracted from gray level
images, and is trained on a combination of publicly avail-
able close-to-frontal face datasets. The implementation can
Training Validation Test
Subjects Faces Subjects Faces Subjects Faces
Known 1085 11012 990 (1002) 3004 (3359) 921 (954) 12636 (15312)
Unknown ? 12156 ? 6688 (7575) ? 17774 (18983)
Masked in Training 116 181 102 228 116 1277
Masked not in Training 0 0 461 1189 526 4466
Total 1201 23349 1553 (1565) 11109 (12351) 1563 (1596) 36153 (40038)
Table 1: DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS AND LABELED FACES. These numbers of subjects and faces are present in the evaluation
protocol. The numbers in parentheses display the updated protocol (cf. Sec. 5.1). Known subjects were labeled with their (positive) ID,
while unknown subjects are labeled as −1. For the masked identities, the participants were given the label −1, they could not differentiate
between them and the unknown identities.
be downloaded from the Python Package Index.3
TinyFacesb: The TinyFaces face detector [16] consists
of a set of scale-specific mini-detectors, each of which is
tuned for a predefined object size and sits on top of a fully
convolutional [22] ResNet101 [13]. Each mini-detector is
implemented as a convolutional filter, which takes convolu-
tional features extracted from multiple layers as input and
outputs a spatial heat map that represents detection confi-
dence at every location. In addition, four filters have been
tied to each mini-detector for bounding box regression [27].
The TinyFaces detector is trained on the training set of
WIDER FACE [31]. During training multi-resolution sam-
pling, balanced sampling [27], and hard negative mining
are applied. During testing the detector works on an im-
age pyramid, while only running mini-detectors tuned for
small object size on the interpolated level. The TinyFaces
algorithm was run by the LqfNetc team.
UCCSa: The UCCS face detector is based on the Base-
line face detector from Bob [2]. Additionally to the LBP
features extracted from gray-level images, color informa-
tion is added in terms of converting the image to HSV color
space and extracting quantized hue (H) and saturation (S)
values. A face detection cascade is trained on a combina-
tion of LBP and color values, using the training set images
of the MOBIO [23], SCface [10], and CelebA [21] datasets,
as well as the training images of the UCCS dataset.
MTCNNd: Faces and facial landmarks are detected by
MTCNN [33]. Besides increasing the minimally detectable
face bounding box to 75 pixels, the publicly available face
detector4 was used unalteredly. The MCTNN face detector
was run by the CVSSPd team.
WVUCVLe: The WVUCVL face detection algorithm is
based on detected joints on the face, inspired by CNN-based
human 2D body-pose estimation methods [17, 7]. First, co-
ordinates of the 18 main joints of the human body (e.g.,
shoulder center, waist, and nose) are extracted, and multi-
pose estimation is applied. Based on the five joints of the
face (nose, both eyes, and both ears), frontal or side face de-
3http://pypi.python.org/pypi/challenge.uccs
4http://github.com/kpzhang93/MTCNN face detection alignment
tection is applied to the boundary of these joints, and a con-
fidence threshold is employed. To decrease the false accept
rate, thresholds are set for checking the size of the bounding
box of each face. Finally, a skin color detector was trained
on parts of the UCCS training set, and the distance between
the distribution of the skin color of the bounding box from
the distribution of the training set is thresholded.
Darknet UOWf : The Darknet UOW Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) model closely follows one of the
publicly available5 architectures described in [26], while
adding a few modifications to accommodate for differ-
ences between the Visual Object Classes Challenge 2012
(VOC2012) [9] dataset used in [26] and the UCCS dataset.
The Darknet UOW architecture consists of 22 convolu-
tional layers followed by 2 fully connected layers, and the
input size of the network has dimensions of 416×416. Each
image is divided into a 5 × 5 grid. For each grid cell, 5
bounding boxes are predicted. For each bounding box, the
center and the dimensions are extracted, as well as a confi-
dence represented with Intersection Over Union (IOU) be-
tween the predicted bounding box and a ground truth.
3.2. Face Recognition
Baseline: For the Baseline face recognition algorithm,3
first the faces of the training set were re-detected, and face
images of 64 × 80 pixels were cropped. Histogram se-
quences of uniform LBP patterns [1] with 16 × 16 pixel
block sizes are extracted. A Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) was performed on PCA-projected features [34], us-
ing all features of unknown identities (−1) in one class, and
each known identity in a separate class. For enrollment of
a subject (including −1), an average of the training set fea-
tures is computed. At test time, LBPHS features of detected
faces are projected into the PCA+LDA subspace, and cosine
similarities to gallery templates are computed.
LqfNetc: A 32 × 32 pixel low-resolution CNN [15] is
used to project each detected and downscaled face image
to a discriminative 128-dimensional face descriptor. The
max-margin based network training incorporates data aug-
5http://pjreddie.com/darknet
mentation strategies such as blurring or adding noise to ad-
just the high quality training data to the low-quality do-
main [14]. About 9M face images from different public and
private datasets serve as training data for the Low-quality
face Network (LqfNet), while no training on the challenge
data is performed. Similar to the Baseline, for identifica-
tion an LDA is learned on the gallery descriptors. Because
the LqfNet is not specifically designed to handle misdetec-
tions, the descriptor distance d is weighted by the detection
confidence c to shape the final recognition score s = c/d.
UCCSa: The UCCS contribution relies on features from
the publicly available6 VGG Face descriptor network [24],
which are extracted of 224×224 pixel cropped images. The
enrollment is based on the Extreme Value Machine (EVM)
[28], which is particularly designed for open-set recogni-
tion. Distributions of cosine distances between deep fea-
tures of different identities are modeled using concepts of
Extreme Value Theory (EVT), and a probability of inclu-
sion is computed for each enrollment feature. Set-cover
[28] merges several features of one identity into a single
model, including a model for the unknown identities (−1).
We optimized EVM parameters [12] on the validation set.
For a probe bounding box, VGG Face descriptors are com-
puted, and the cosine similarities between probe feature and
model features are multiplied with the probability of inclu-
sion of the corresponding EVM model.
CVSSPd: Features are extracted by two 29 layer
CNNs. The first network is trained on combined CASIA-
Webface [32] and UMD [4] face datasets, while the other is
trained on CASIA-Webface, UMD and PaSC [5] datasets.
Two feature vectors are extracted from each face and its
mirror image, and merged by element-wise summation. The
template for each enrolled subject is the average of the face
features extracted from the gallery images. For the un-
known subjects (−1), the face features are used as cohort
samples for test-normalization. During testing, the face fea-
tures are extracted and the cosine similarity scores between
the templates and cohort samples are computed. For the
class of unknown subjects, the similarity score is the neg-
ative of the minimum of all the templates scores. In total,
there are 1086 scores for each probe face and those scores
are normalized by test-normalization. The final score is the
average of the two CNN models.
4. Evaluation
The face detection evaluation is performed on the test
set where the participants provided detected face bounding
boxes including confidence scores. For face recognition,
participants turned in up to ten identity predictions for each
bounding box along with a similarity score for each pre-
diction. The evaluation scripts3 for the validation set were
6http://www.robots.ox.ac.uk/∼vgg/software/vgg face
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Figure 2: FACE DETECTION EVALUATION. A Free Re-
sponse Operating Characteristics (FROC) curve is shown for the
test set. The horizontal axis includes the number of false accepts
(misdetections), while the vertical axis outlines the relative num-
ber of detected faces. The dotted gray line indicates equal numbers
of correct detections and false accepts.
given to the participants. For all our evaluations, colors
across plots correspond to identical participants.
4.1. Face Detection
To evaluate the correctness of each bounding box, we
use a modification of the Jaccard index, where the origi-
nal Jaccard index is known as the Intersection Over Union
(IOU) of the ground truth and the detected bounding box.
As the ground truth is up to four times larger than the face
(cf. Fig. 1(b)), we modify the union term to not penalize
detections smaller than the ground truth:
J(G,D) =
|G ∩D|
max
{ |G|
4
, |G ∩D|
}
+ |D| − |G ∩D|
≈ |G ∩D||G ∪D| (1)
where D is the area of detected bounding box and G is
the area of ground-truth bounding box. Hence, when the
detected bounding box D covers at least a fourth of the
ground-truth bounding box G and is entirely contained in
G, modified Jaccard index J = 1 is achieved. In our evalu-
ation, we accept all bounding boxes with a modified Jaccard
index J ≥ 0.5.
For the face detection evaluation, bounding boxes along
with their confidence scores are used in a Free Response
Operator Characteristic (FROC) curve [8]. Particularly, we
split the confidence scores c into positives C+, i.e., where
the detected bounding box overlaps with a ground truth ac-
cording to (1), and the negatives C− where J(G,D) < 0.5
for each ground-truth bounding box G. For a given number
of false accepts FA, we compute a confidence threshold θ:
θ = argmax
θ′
∣∣{c | c ∈ C− ∧ c ≥ θ′}∣∣ < FA . (2)
Using this threshold, the detection rate DR is computed as
the relative number of detected faces where the detection
FA/FI Baseline TinyFaces UCCS MTCNN WVUCVL Darknet UOW Baseline LqfNet UCCS CVSSP
10 346 1008 894 0 37 359 40 58 65 42
100 4481 6466 5962 3211 2664 2774 247 306 312 222
1000 15506 23733 17350 18772 25124 14721 2236 750 2892 2400
10000 22802 35349 30139 33691 34519 31441 3326 7834 6858 10376
100000 26625 35789 33152 33691 34519 34434 3473 8921 6858 11276
Table 2: FACE DETECTION AND RECOGNITION RESULTS. The number of detected (left) and correctly identified (right) faces
of the test set are presented for certain numbers of false accepts or false identifications, respectively. For algorithms with fewer false
accepts/identifications, the total number of detected/identified faces is given. The best results are highlighted in color.
confidence is above threshold:
DR(θ) =
∣∣{c | c ∈ C+ ∧ c ≥ θ}∣∣
M
, (3)
where M is the total number of labeled faces given in
Tab. 1. Finally, the FROC curve plots theDR over the num-
ber of false accepts, for given values of FA.
Fig. 2 presents the results of the participants on test set,
while Tab. 2 contains more detailed results. Despite the dif-
ficulty of the dataset, all face detectors (besides the Base-
line) detected at least 33000 of the 36153 labeled test set
faces. Honestly, we (the challenge evaluators) were posi-
tively surprised by this result. However, these high results
can only be achieved with a relative high number of false ac-
cepts. Still, the best performing face detectors (TinyFaces
and WVUCVL) detected more than 23000 faces with 1000
false accepts, which – given the difficulty of many of the
faces – is a very good result. On the other hand, assum-
ing 5 faces in each section of a 5 × 5 grid cell in the Dark-
net UOW algorithm leads to a large amount of false accepts,
and might have missed some faces, i.e., when more than 5
faces were present in a certain grid cell.
4.2. Face Recognition
To participate in the face recognition challenge, partici-
pants were given only the raw images, i.e, without any la-
bels. In such an open-set scenario, a face recognition algo-
rithm has three goals. First – similarly to closed-set identi-
fication – if the probe face is of a known identity, the cor-
responding gallery template of that identity must have the
highest similarity across all gallery templates. Second, if
the probe face is of an unknown identity, the similarities to
all gallery templates need to be small, or the probe should
be labeled unknown. Finally, when the face detector has a
misdetection, that region should be handled as unknown.
For our face recognition challenge we evaluate the par-
ticipants using the Detection and Identification Rate (DIR)
curve [25] on rank 1. For each probe image, we split the
similarity scores s of the provided bounding boxes into two
groups: positives S+ and negatives S−. The positive group
S+ contains similarity scores of correct identifications. For
each ground-truth bounding box of a known identity, the de-
tected bounding box with the highest overlap is considered,
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Figure 3: FACE RECOGNITION EVALUATION. A Detection
and Identification Rate (DIR) curve at rank 1 is shown for the test
set. The horizontal axis includes the number of false identifica-
tions, while the vertical axis outlines the relative number of cor-
rectly identified faces. The dotted gray line indicates equal num-
bers of correct and false identifications.
but only if the modified Jaccard index exceeds the overlap
threshold J ≥ 0.5 defined in Sec. 4.1. If the assigned sub-
ject label with the highest similarity score s of that bounding
box corresponds to the correct identity, s is added to S+.
The negative group S− contains similarity scores of false
identifications. It is composed of the unknown face images
and the false accepts, which are labeled as a known iden-
tity. For each ground-truth bounding box of an unknown
identity, the detected bounding box with the highest over-
lap was considered. If the assigned subject label with the
highest similarity score s of that bounding is not −1, s is
added to S−. For false accepts, i.e., where the modified
Jaccard index to every ground-truth bounding box is lower
than J < 0.5, and where the highest similarity score s of
that bounding box is not labeled −1, s is appended to S−.
A decision threshold ϑ on the similarity scores can be
computed for a given number of false identifications FI:
ϑ(FI) = argmax
ϑ′
∣∣{s | s ∈ S− ∧ s ≥ ϑ′}∣∣< FI . (4)
Using this decision threshold, the relative number of cor-
rectly detected and identified persons is computed as:
DIR(ϑ) =
∣∣{s | s ∈ S+ ∧ s ≥ ϑ}∣∣
N
, (5)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4: AUTOMATICALLY ASSIGNED IDENTITIES. Some examples of automatically assigned identities are presented at the left
of each pair, together with a corresponding gallery face of the newly assigned identity. New faces are assigned when all three competitors
agree on the same identity. The identity in (a) is assigned wrongly, while the remaining identities are correct. The gallery and probe images
shown in (d) were taken at different days.
where N is the number of known faces, cf. Tab. 1. Finally,
the DIR curve plots the detection and identification rate over
the number of false identifications, for selected values of
FI . In our DIR plots, we do not normalize the false iden-
tifications by the total number of unknown probe faces as
done by Phillips et al. [25]. As our group of false identifica-
tions I− includes false accepts, which are different for each
face detector, normalization would favor participants with a
high number of false accepts.
Fig. 3 and Tab. 2 present the results of the participants
on the test set. Given the difficulty of the dataset, from
a closed-set perspective the results are impressive: almost
90 % of the faces were correctly identified at rank 1 by
CVSSP. From an open-set perspective, however, this comes
at the price of more than 30000 false identifications. LqfNet
did not reach such a high identification rate, but still pro-
duced around 20000 false identifications. Hence, for both
algorithms up to 3 times more false identifications are raised
than people are identified. Even though the number of probe
faces containing unknown identities is higher than the num-
ber of probes of known identities (cf. Tab. 1), the number of
false identifications is far too high to be usable in a real sce-
nario. On the other hand, the UCCS algorithm, which is the
best algorithm with lower numbers of false identifications,
reaches only an identification accuracy of around 50 %.
5. Discussion
5.1. Database Clean-up
The UCCS dataset is manually labeled, both the face
bounding boxes and the identities. We are aware that there
are some errors in the labels, including non-marked faces in
the face detection challenge, as well as faces that are labeled
as−1, but which are actually one of the known gallery iden-
tities. To clean up the dataset and add face bounding boxes
as well as identity labels, we opted for an automatic process
– given the short time to write up this paper. The results of
this automatic process are given in parentheses in Tab. 1.
To automatically mark missing faces, we use the face
detectors of the participants, excluding the Baseline detec-
tor. We select those bounding boxes that are detected by the
majority of face detectors with high confidence, i.e., where
detections of three algorithms overlap with IOU ≥ 0.25.
For each of the detectors, we computed a separate threshold
θ at 2500 false accepts in the validation set. To generate a
new bounding box, we merged the overlapping detections,
weighted with their respectively normalized detection confi-
dence, and up-scaled them by a factor of 1.2. In this way, we
added 1242 face bounding boxes in the validation set, and
3885 faces in the test set, which we labeled as unknown.
We have manually checked around 100 images with auto-
matically added bounding boxes, and all of them contain
valid faces. Still, we have found that some of the faces are
not marked by this automatic process. However, for lower
confidence thresholds, we found that some overlapping de-
tections do not contain faces.
After adding these new unknown faces into the dataset,
we automatically tested all faces, for which the identity was
unknown. If all three face recognition algorithms agree on
the same known identity on rank 1, we assign this identity to
that face. Using this technique, 355 faces in the validation
set are assigned to known identities, while in the test set
it amounts to 2676 faces. Manually checking around 100
newly assigned faces in the validation set, we found exactly
one face, where the label is incorrectly assigned. This face
is shown in Fig. 4(a), including one of the gallery faces of
the assigned identity. On the other hand, all the other in-
spected faces are correctly labeled, including images from
different days, see Fig. 4(d) for an example. Note that we
could not update the masked identities, cf. Tab. 1.
When evaluating the participants’ detection and recogni-
tion algorithms on the updated labels of the test set, we can
see that the results generally improve. In the FROC curve
in Fig. 5(a), out of the 40038 faces that are labeled in the
updated test set, two algorithms can detect around 90 % of
them at 1000 false accepts. Interestingly, in comparison to
Fig. 2, MTCNN is almost able to catch up with TinyFaces
and WVUCVL. Finally, TinyFaces detects almost all faces,
but on the cost of more than 30000 false accepts.
The DIR curve in Fig. 5(b) shows a difference to Fig. 3
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(a) Face Detection
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(b) Face Recognition
Figure 5: UPDATED EVALUATION. FROC and DIR curves of all participants are displayed on the test set for the automatically updated
ground-truth labels. The dotted gray line indicates equal numbers of correct detections/identifications and false accepts/identifications.
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(a) Same Day
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(b) Different Day
Figure 6: SAME VS. DIFFERENT DAY. DIR curves are comparing templates and probes taken on (a) the same and (b) different days.
The horizontal axis includes the number of false identifications, while the vertical axis outlines the rate of correctly identified faces.
with respect to the order of the participants on lower num-
bers of false identifications, where now the LqfNet algo-
rithm performs considerably better. Generally, we can see
an improvement of all algorithms, and at 1000 false identi-
fications now both UCCS and CVSSP are able to identify
around half of the known subjects correctly.
5.2. Analysis of Time Differences
Though the UCCS dataset was collected over more than
two years, many people appear only in a single day. The
training and validation sets are built such that for most of
the known identities all faces stem from a single day. In the
test set, we have put some images of known subjects, which
are taken at a different day than present in the training set.
The updated protocol of the test set contains 20647 faces
of 932 identities taken at the same day as the training set
faces of the corresponding identities, and 14432 faces of
209 identities with different days.
In Fig. 6 we show the difference of the participants’ re-
sults between the two sets of probe faces in the updated test
set. As we could not split the unknown faces into same
or different days, the same false identifications are used in
both plots. It comes as no surprise that the different day
faces are harder to be identified, the rates in Fig. 6(b) are
considerably lower than in Fig. 6(a). At 1000 false identifi-
cations, all algorithms are below 20 % DIR, and below 3 %
at 100 false identifications. While the Baseline is practically
useless when images are taken at different days, all the par-
ticipating algorithms are not much more reliable either.
5.3. Analysis of False Identifications
In the evaluations above, false identifications are com-
puted jointly from unknown faces and false accepts (mis-
detections). To evaluate the impact of each of these on the
performance, we split the false identifications. Here, we
only use the masked faces, i.e., which have been given as
−1 to the participants, but where we know the identity la-
bels. The masked faces are further split up into masked
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(a) Masked in Training
0 5000 10000 15000
Correctly Identified
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
or
re
ct
R
ej
ec
ti
on
R
at
e
Baseline
LqfNet
UCCS
CVSSP
(b) Masked not in Training
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(c) False Accepts
Figure 7: EVALUATION OF FALSE IDENTIFICATIONS. In (a) and (b) the percentage of correctly rejected masked identities are
plotted over the number of correctly identified faces. In (c) the relative number of correctly rejected false accepts (misdetections) is plotted
over the number of correctly identified faces, normalized by the total number of false accepts per detection algorithm.
identities that are in the training set, and masked identities
that are not, cf. Tab. 1. The evaluation is performed on the
automatically cleaned dataset.
To have a better comparable evaluation, we plot cor-
rectly rejected masked faces or false accepts over the cor-
rectly identified known identities. Hence, the similarity
score threshold ϑ is now computed over S+ (cf. Sec. 4.2),
while the correct rejection rate is computed as:
CRR(ϑ) =
∣∣{s | s ∈ S= ∧ s < ϑ}∣∣∣∣{S=}∣∣ (6)
where S=⊂S− are the corresponding false identifications.
In Fig. 7(a) we plot the number of correctly rejected
masked images where the identities are included in the
training set, while Fig. 7(b) contains the masked images
where subjects are not part of the training set. As algo-
rithms that model unknown faces as a separate class during
training, the LqfNet and UCCS algorithms decrease rejec-
tion capabilities for unknown identities seen during training
(Fig. 7(b)), which is counterintuitive, but we attribute this
behavior to some wrong labels in the training set. On the
other hand, the CVSSP algorithm did not make use of the
training set and, thus, its performance is stable with respect
to the masked identities.
Finally, Fig. 7(c) shows how the algorithms deal with
their respective false accepts. There, the UCCS and LqfNet
algorithms are able to reject almost all false accepts, even
with low threshold ϑ (high number of correct identifica-
tions), while CVSSP starts dropping the correct rejection
rate and finally assigns a known identity label to each of its
false accepts at low thresholds.
6. Conclusion
We have evaluated the participants’ results of the un-
constrained face detection and the open-set face recogni-
tion challenge. We were surprised by the quality of the face
detectors, and the closed-set recognition capabilities of the
algorithms on our very difficult dataset. However, open-
set face recognition, i.e., when face recognition algorithms
are confronted with unknown faces and misdetections is far
from being solved, especially when probe faces are taken at
different days than the gallery faces.
For this paper, we automatically updated our ground-
truth labels by majority voting of the participants’ algo-
rithms. With this, we surely have missed some of the faces,
and some identity labels are definitely wrong. We will use
the participants’ results to start a semi-manual re-labeling
of the data, i.e., we propose overlapping bounding boxes to
a human observer who decides whether a face is seen, or
whether two face images show the same identity. The train-
ing and validation sets will be made public after this process
is finished, while the test set will be kept secret and used in
further challenges.
For the present competition, we provided a biased evalu-
ation protocol, i.e., the training set is identical to the enroll-
ment set. As we have seen, already with this biased protocol
open-set face recognition is difficult. More unbiased eval-
uations would split off several identities into a training set,
and enrollment and probing would be performed on a differ-
ent set of identities. We will investigate on such an unbiased
protocol in future work.
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